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HISTORICAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
TOWARD MONOPLY
JOHN E. SCHEFTER*
Is REGULATION NECESSARY'>
The extent of regulation of industry is basically dependent upon
the socio-economic system within which industry operates. Govern-
ment regulation is rampant under socialism and absent within a
laissez-faire economy It is not within the context of this article
to discuss the relative merits of all systems within the spectrum
of socio-economic systems. Let it be enough to assert that the degree
of regulation and the public policy of a nation toward its industry
is dependent upon the nature of the socio-economic system in
question.
Kent once declared that the preamble of the constitution of the
United States enacted Adam Smith's WEALTH OF NATIONS.1 If
there ever was a period in which the United States approached a
laissez-faire economy, it was during the last half of the eighteenth
century to the latter part of the nineteenth century The frontier
was the nursery of individualism and democracy, economic, political,
and social. 2 This period allowed competition to run, unbridled, on
the road to ruin. Organizational devices were employed to secure
and enhance control of the market. Various types of agreements
and understandings that imposed limitations on competition were
employed. Threats, cajolery, outright bludgeoning and more subtle
methods of whipping competitors into line were employed. 3 It was,
as Proudhon said in his CONTRADICTIONS E'CONOMIQUES, com-
petition that was killing competition.4
The trusts, mergers, pools, and combinations that were formed
before the antitrust laws became effective provide an excellent study
m the misuse and abuse of competition.
*Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota
State University, Fargo, North Dakota. A debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Nelson of the
Agricultural Economics Department for his advice and encouragement while writing this
article.
1. Hamilton, Law and Economics, 19 Am. EcoN. REv. 56 (1929).
2. Wright, Topics in Economic History, 16 Am. EcoN. REV. 269 (Supp. 1926).
3. PEGRUM, D.F., THE REGULATION OF INDUSTRY 8 (1949).
4. Liefmann, R., Monopoly or Competition as the Basis of Government Trust Policy,
29 Q. J. ECON. 316 (1915).
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In a broad sense there was but one important and im-
pelling cause for the growth of trusts-the desire for greater
profits... There are three main methods by which profits
can be increased through forming a trust: (1) by checking
the abnormal competition that is reducing profits below a
fair return obtainable in an industry on the average under
normal competition; (2) by reducing costs through securing
any advantages of large scale production and eliminating
wastes of competition; (3) by raising prices through trust
control above the level yielding a fair return so as to secure
a monopoly profit.5
The principle reason that trusts were organized in this country,
then, was the desire to end competition and thereby to acquire at
least a partial practical monopoly The combination which acquired
a monopoly had the power to dictate terms to both the laborer and
the consumer. In other words, the trusts were able to do as they
pleased.6
More important than the motives leading to the formation of
the trusts were the conditions which enabled the empire builders
to build up and maintain monopolistic power Without the methods
used to build trusts, the trusts would have been of no social
significance.7
Principle among the methods used to build trusts was unfair
competition," especially where backed by large amounts of re-
sources. Next to unfair competition, the possession of patent rights
was instrumental in the trust movement. Next in rank might be
placed those methods of control of a natural resource and railroad
rate discriminations that were employed in the trust movement.
Of no small importance, in the trust movement, was the check on
foreign competition provided by an overprotective tariff. Last, but
not least, were those trusts which did not enjoy any special method
of formation other than a mutual desire to act together in order
to check competition.9
The factors primarily responsible for the suppression of com-
petition were the growing scale of production and the spread of
the railroad system coupled with the rate discrimination policies
of the period. The years between 1850 and 1885 mark the period
5. Wright, The Rise of Monopoly in the United States, 23 Am. ECON. REV. 1 (Supp.
1933).
6. Raymond, Industrtal Combsnations Existing Law and Suggested Legislation, 20
J. Pol. ECON. 311 (1912).
7. Wright, Topics in Economic H4story, op. cit. supra note 2, at 269.
8. The methods of unfair competition were many in number but some of those
frequently used were the various forms of price discrimination, railroad rebates, exclusive
dealer contracts and misrepresentation of product.
9. Wright, The Rise of Monopoly sn the United States, op. cit. supra note 5, at 2.
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when the railroads were throwing their ribbons of steel across the
continent. During this same period the growing scale of production
and increasing size of the business unit were realized. This latter
development was mostly due to technological advances that intro-
duced new machine methods and to a rapidly increasing population.
The two decades from 1870 to 1890 brought the most rapid rate of
growth that the nation with a manifest destiny had ever experienced.
The growing scale of production, increasing size of the business
unit, rate discrimination, expanding railroads and increasing market
size were the factors that contributed to the increasingly intensive
destruction of competition.1"
The mere existence of the trusts did not condemn them. If
the trusts had never "rocked the boat," they probably would never
have been condemned. However, the devastation of competition grew
as the number and size of the trusts grew The trusts paid dividends
on watered capital. They paid large sums of money for the plants
of competitors and then abandoned them. They attempted to monopo-
lize the resources they used in production. They "wiped out" com-
petition by selling goods at less than cost and then recouped the
loss off the general market. They acquired secret subsidiary com-
panies in an attempt to capture the trade of those people who would
not deal with a trust. The trusts obtained agreements from other
persons, by coercive methods, if necessary, not to engage in the
trade of the trust. They discriminated among customers. They
refused to deal with competitors. They refused to deal with people
who dealt with competitors. They sold their products under restric-
tive terms aimed at competitors. In short, they bought off, kept
off, and killed off competition.11
As the competition among trusts became more intense, the
fruits of merger, combination, and trusts became more enticing.
Competition threatened to become mutually destructive and business
sought refuge in monopolistic agreements, trusts, and the merger
of competing firms. As a result, many of the nation's major indus-
tries were brought under some form of monopolistic control during
the 1880's. Monopoly power controlled the market in petroleum,
cottonseed oil, linseed oil, cordage, sugar, meat packing, lead, coal,
whisky, tobacco, matches, gunpowder, and elsewhere.
12
Many people, especially farmers, small businessmen, and labor-
ers, suffered as this process continued. The farmers, in particular,
were injured by the rise of the trusts. They experienced a steady
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 1-3.
12. WrLcox. CLAIR, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BusnqEss 52 (rev. ed. 1960).
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fall in farm prices, high freight rates, high interest rates and in-
creasingly higher prices for agricultural implements. Small inde-
pendent businessmen were driven from their business field if they
refused to be absorbed by the monopoly powers. Laborers and the
producers of raw materials were similarly injured by the results
of monopolistic arrangements. The end results of unrefereed com-
petition gave rise to widespread discontent.13
The time for action had come. Finding their roots in farmers'
organizations in the west and south, there developed farmer-labor
parties that were in strong opposition to monopoly power 14 During
the eighties these farmer-labor parties ran an antimonopoly candi-
date for the presidency and came to control a number of state
legislatures. The Democratic and Republican parties sought to win
the votes of citizens by professing opposition to monopoly 15 The
democratic process achieved its purpose by reflecting the wishes
of the citizens in the antitrust laws that began to appear in several
states.
Traditionally the people of the United States have felt that
our society is at its best when people are loosely knit together in
the free and open market through which they can express their
interests in the supply of and demand for goods and services. In
the open market each consumer has a voice and, for the most part,
the competitive motives protect the consumer The American
people began to realize that:
The open market is not a free gift from heaven; it must
be sought and promoted. The government has a large and
indispensable role to play in creating and sustaining it. We
recall the words of the late president of the University of
Virginia: "Freedom is not a heritage but a fresh conquest
for each generation."
1
1
Society turned to the only means of regulation it had available.
The people employed the common law, enacted state statutes, and
eventually, employed Article 8, Section I of the Constitution of the
United States.18 Americans had found it necessary and desirable
to regulate industry
13. Ibid.
14. Although the traditional view holds that public regulation was initiated by Granger
discontent, there were opposing points of view. Kolko effectively documents his contention
that the railroads actually sought federal regulation in order to prevent the private pools
from failing and as a means of circumventing tough state laws. See KOLKO, G., RAILROADS
AND REGULATION, 1877-1916, (1965).
15. WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 12, at 63.
16. Schmidt, E. P., Monopoly and Competition, 36 AM. EcoN. REv. 213 (Supp. 1946).
17. Ibid.
18. Art. VIII, § 1 provides the federal government with the power to regulate
interstate commerce.
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COMBINATIONS, MERGERS, AND TRUSTS AT COMMON LAW
The legal system of the United States is founded on common
law As a body of rules, common law designates that part of the
law which is traditional in form. Common law is composed of those
rules of law that have developed out of the customs which have
been incorporated in court precedent.19
Common law, it may be said, imports a system of unwritten
law, not evidenced by statute. Its sources are found in the
usages, habits, manners, and customs of a people; its seat,
in the breast of the judges who are its expounders.2 0
Common law, where such exists, must yield to the statute law
Until the late eighties, however, there were very few state statutes
dealing with industrial combinations and trusts. Due to the lack of
statute law, there was a considerable body of common law doctrine
developed with respect to combinations and restraints of trade.
21
The earliest provisions of the law in England relevant to monop-
oly were those which, in effect, related to the one offense of "corner-
ing the market" by one method or another and thus creating public
injury by enhancing price. Under common law, monopoly was never
illegal and competition was never compulsory Modern industry,
however, changed the situation and the common law changed ac-
cordingly 22
The change in the common law was accomplished by adopting
the doctrine of conspiracy The doctrine of conspiracy was inter-
preted to mean that a combination formed for any purpose was a
criminal conspiracy if the intent of the persons combining was to
injure another party Although the acts of an individual might not
be offensive, the same acts, if committed by a combination, were
"actionable at law if they were intended to injure a third party ''23
The adaptation of the common law to modern industry against
monopoly, trusts, and combinations has been mainly accomplished
through the state courts.
One of the first cases involving a trust agreement was brought
before a Tennessee court in 1888.24 The court held that the agree-
ment entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant was a contract
of partnership between two corporations and that the defendant had
19. PEGaUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 18.
20. JONES, ELIOT, The Trust Problem tn the United States 301 (1929).
21. Id. at 300.
22. PEORUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 205.
23. Ibid.
24. Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396 (1899).
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no power to enter such a partnership. 25 The contention that the
corporation which formed a combination using a contract had com-
mitted an act ultra vires of the corporate charter was frequently
used by the courts of common law
In State v Standard Oil Company,27 the court held that the
agreement entered into by the defendant was ultra vires. The court
further stated that the purpose of the Standard Oil trust was to
"establish a virtual monopoly of the business of producing petro-
leum, and of manufacturing, refining, and dealing in it and all its
products. All such associations are contrary to the policy of our
State.Y' 28 The court forbade the defendant to carry through the
agreement by which it had entered into the trust.
In State v Nebraska Distilling Co., 2 9 the court extended the
ultra vzres concept to include all contracts entered into by a cor-
porate entity for the purpose of forming a trust the object of which
was to destroy competition. The judge pointed out that the object
of the defendant in entering into a trust was to destroy competition
and create a monopoly and that any contract entered into with such
an object was null and void.80
In Richardson v Buhl,31 the court went further and held that
any contract entered into to further the objects and purposes of
a monopoly was against public policy and therefore void. Monopoly
in trade or in any kind of business, according to the court, is
"odious" to our form of government. The court further stated that
the monopoly's tendency is destructive to the instincts of a free
people.32
In Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v People,33 the court held
that plaintiff was designed to be a combination in restraint of trade.
The plaintiff, while in fact not a trust, was accomplishing the
objectives of a trust.3 4 The court concluded:
There is no magic in a corporate organization which can
purge the trust scheme of its illegality, and it remains as
essentially opposed to the principles of sound public policy
25. JONES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 312. (citing Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, supra
note 24).
26. Beyond (legal power) , beyond authority.
27. 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892).
28. JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 314. (citing State v. Standard Oil Company, supro
note 27).
29. 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W 155 (1890).
30. JoNas, op. cit. supra note 20, at 312. (citing State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., supra
note 29).
31. 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102 (1889).
32. JoNEs, op. cit. 8upra note 20, at 315. (citing Richardson v. Buhl, supra note 31).
33. 156 ILL. App. 448, 41 N.E. 188 (1895).
34. JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 316. (citing Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v.
People, supra note 33).
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as when the trust was in existence. It was illegal before
[as a trust], and is illegal still, and for the same reasons.8 5
It has become evident that the maintenance of competition was
supported by the common law The common law was limited m its
effectiveness, however, as an instrument of public policy
Initiative in taking action was left to plaintiffs m private
suits. Where all of the participants in an agreement
voluntarily adhered to its terms, and where no one had the
courage or the means to sue for damages, no case was
brought and here monopoly continued undisturbed.38
In the late eighties it became evident that it was necessary
to make provisions for public prosecution and the imposition of
public penalties. This was to be done through legislative enactment.
THE STATE ANTITRUST LAWS
Kansas was the first state to Initiate an antitrust law; the State
placed an antitrust law on its books in 1889. By 1891 eighteen states
had followed suit and enacted antitrust laws. Today antitrust laws
are found on the statute books of more than forty states. Some of
the states' antitrust laws forbid specific monopolistic practices while
others condemn monopolizations in more general terms.3 7 The most
thorough attempts to deal with monopolization were made by Texas
and Missouri. It was not difficult for legal ingenuity to escape the
effects of state statutes in the absence of federal statutes. The
charter-mongering activities by some states and the laxity of other
states made any antitrust program on the state level a farce, even
for Texas and Missouri.38 The continued growth of large industry,
the increasing problem with the railroads, and "the predatory prac-
tices of young and aggressive industrial leaders with their public-
be-damned attitude, and widespread financial abuse"3 9 made it
imperative that the federal government employ Article 8, Section I
of the Constitution and enact a federal antitrust statute.
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
The Sherman Antitrust Act
The activities of the Standard Oil trust, the sugar trust, and
various kinds of monopoly agreements in whisky, meat products,
35. Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, supra note 33, at 202.
36. WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 12, at 51.
37. Id. at 53.
38. PimauM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 233.
39. Id. at 234.
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steel rails, structural steel, linseed oil, paper, oatmeal, copper, hard
coal, lead, beef, and sugar necessitated federal action. As Justice
Harlan said m 1911.
All who recall the condition of the country m 1890 will re-
member that there was everywhere, among the people, a
deep feeling of unrest. The nation had been rid of human
slavery . but the conviction was universal that the
country was in real danger from another kind of slavery
sought to be fastened on the American people, namely the
slavery that would result from aggregation of capital m the
hands of a few individuals and corporations controlling, for
their own profit and advantage exclusively the production
and sale of the necessaries of life.4 0
In 1888, both the Democratic and the Republican parties in-
cluded antitrust legislation in their platforms. The opposition toward
trusts began to precipitate on December 4, 1889, when a Bill to
Declare Unlawful, Trusts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade
and Production was introduced in the Senate by Senator Sherman of
Ohio. No hearings were held; the bill that finally emerged from
the Congressional Committee on Finance and the Judiciary Commit-
tee was briefly debated on February 27, March 21, and March 24 to
March 27 and finally on April 8, 1890. The debate raised no funda-
mental issues and the bill passed the Senate on April 8, 1890, with
only one dissenting vote and passed the House on June 21, 1890,
without a record vote. President Harrison signed the Sherman
Antitrust Bill into law on July 2, 1890.41
The major portions of the Sherman Antitrust Act may be briefly
summarized as follow*
4 2
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Sec. 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor
Sec. 3: Every contract, combination in the form of a trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
40. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1910).
41. 20 CONG. IRc. 1467 (1889).
42. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
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or commerce in any territory of the United States
or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of
trade or commerce between any such territory and
another, or between any such Territory or terri-
tories and any state or states or foreign nations is
hereby declared illegal.
During the debate on another antitrust bill in 1903, Senator
George Hoar of Massachusetts made the following reflections con-
cerning the Sherman Bill:
[I]t was not expected that it would wholly or even largely
remedy the existing evil, still less that it would be an
absolute security against all threatened dangers.
They (Congress) expected that there would grow up under
it a body of decisions in which the court should expand it
reasonably, and when these decisions were promulgated that
other and additional remedies would be provided by law 43
[I]t is better, I think, to go carefully, one step at a time;
to repair and strengthen our edifice rather than to under-
take any rash measures which might bring the whole temple
down upon our heads."
The Sherman Act was the only important antitrust bill to be
placed on the federal statute books for nearly a quarter of a
century Provisions similar to those incorporated in the Sherman
Bill were applied to persons importing goods into the United States
under sections 73 to 77 of the Tariff Act of 1894.45 In 1908 and 1910,
violation of the Sherman Act was made a basis for cancellation
of rights conferred by Congress to certain lands. Violators operating
boats were denied the privilege of passing through the Panama
Canal by virtue of the Panama Canal Act of 1912.46
Although the Sherman Law laid down the broad foundation for
statutory control of industry, it proved to be quite ineffective as
a preventative for the rape of competition by capitalistic organi-
zations. Administration of the law soon made evident three funda-
mental difficulties which clearly necessitated supplemental legis-
lation. The inadequacy of an enforcement procedure that placed
emphasis upon punitive rather than preventive measures and relied
solely on the action of the courts was primarily responsible for
the ineffectiveness of the act. Because of the variations in enthusiasm
for the objectives of the Sherman Act by the different administrations
43. 36 CONG. REC. 518 (1903) (remarks of Senator HIoor).
44. Ibid.
45. 28 Stat. 509 (1894), 15 U.S.C. H3 8-11 (1964).
46. 37 Stat. 560 (1912), 15 U.S.C. § 31 46 U.S.C. § 11, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 51 (1964).
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in Washington, there arose a difficulty of securing a reasonable
consistency in the development of policy l Under the Harrison
administration, four bills in equity and three indictments were
brought under the antitrust act; two were successful. Under the
Cleveland administration, there were brought four bills in equity,
two indictments, and two contempt proceedings; one resulted in
a federal victory Under the McKinley administration, no criminal
prosecutions were brought and a meager three bills in equity It
was during this administration that the trust movement reached
its height, and yet not a single suit against a trust was successful.
Under the Roosevelt administration, the Sherman Antitrust Act was
enforced with decided vigor Roosevelt's administration brought
eighteen bills in equity, twenty-five indictments, and one forfeiture
proceeding. Under the Taft administration there were brought forty-
six bills in equity, forty-three indictments, and one contempt pro-
ceeding. Under Wilson's administration (first term), there were
brought thirteen bills in equity and twenty-one indictments.48 A
third factor that weakened the effectiveness of the Sherman Bill
was that the successful prosecution of some practices and devices
caused the leaders of the trusts and combinations to resort to
other practices and devices which were less vulnerable before the
law.4 9
Representative Volstead of Minnesota pointed out another reason
for the ineffectiveness of the Sherman Law when he made the
following comments before the House on May 22, 1914:
The trouble [with the Sherman Law] has been this, not
that the law has not been upon the statute books, but that
there has always been strong sympathy, both on the part
of the jury and on the part of the court, for the men who
have been carrying on these gigantic operations. They have
all felt a little as though there was some virtue in their
vast combinations, as though some of these men were a
little too good to be put behind prison bars. 50
The following list of cases where convictions were obtained
under the criminal clause of the Sherman Act illustrates the small
fines that were imposed upon individuals as sole punishment for
restraint of trade. "It should be borne in mind that these total
fines are usually distributed among several individuals thus making
the sum paid by each an insignificant matter."'"
47. PEGRUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 240.
48. JONES, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 445.
49. PEGRUM, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 240.
50. 51 CONG. REC. 9079 (1914) (remarks of Representative Volstead).
51. Steven. W H., The Trade Commission Act, 4 AM. ECON. REV. 854 (1914).
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United States v Simmons (1903) $ 265.00
United States v National Umbrella Frame Co.
(1907) 3,000.00
United States v Santa Rita Mining & Store Co.
(1907) 2,000.00
United States v Federal Salt Co. (1903) 1,000.00
United States v F A. Amsden Lumber Co. (1906) 2,000.00
United States v Imperial Window Glass Co.
(1910) 10,000.00
On August 25, 1915, Senator Thompson of Kansas exhibited before
the Senate a list of 628 trusts. The Senator's list showed seven
trusts capitalized at over one billion dollars and 29 trusts capitalized
at over one million dollars. He made the following statement, in-
dicating the extent of the trust movement, before the Senate:
[W] e are welcomed into the world by the milk trust and
rocked in a cradle built by the furniture trust. As we proceed
through life we find practically everything we eat and
everything we wear furnished by a trust and nearly every
business in which we may wish to engage completely mon-
opolized; and, at last, as we approach death we are brought
face to face with the coffin trust, by which we are finally
conveyed to our last resting place. 52
As a result of the developments mentioned above, the platform
of the three major parties engaged in the presidential campaign
of 1912 included proposed legislation to alleviate the trust problem.58
The trust legislation of 1914 represented the fruition of the policy
laid before the public during the victorious campaign of the
Democratic party
The Trust Legislation of 1914
On May 22, 1914 (2nd Session 63rd Congress), Representative
Webb of North Carolina introduced before the House An Act to
Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopo-
lies and for Other Purposes."
Representative Madden of Illinois begged the Democratic party
to "stay their ravages" in the following statement before the House:
(Ilt would be impossible to portray the full and ultimate
effects of the program of legislation laid and to be laid
before us to constitute the Democratic trust-or antitrust
52. 51 CONG. REc. 14222 (1914) (remarks of Senator Thompson),
53. PEORUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 240.
54. 51 CoNo, REc. 9068 (1914).
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program. To compare it to the effects, local and external,
of the uprisings, revolutions, and counter-revolutions going on
in Mexico-would be to unduly magnify the latter, and to
draw comparisons between Villa and Carranza and the
Democratic leaders would be too intensely personal. 55
Representative Kelly of Pennsylvania asserted that the American
people had a right "to expect a better measure than this weak,
halting, halfway attempt at a remedy of intolerable conditions. '56
Kelly delcared that:
[Tlhere is no golden mean between right and wrong, be-
tween courage and cowardice, between honor and dishonor,
between patriotism and treason, between the people's rights
and monopoly 11
The Clayton Bill passed the House on June 5, 1914, by a vote
of 277 yeas against 54 nays.58 The bill was then referred to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 6, 1914, and was reported
by the Committee, with amendments, to the Senate on July 22,
1914. 59 After being amended more than ninety times, the bill passed
the Senate on September 2, 1914.60 The House objected to the
Senate's amendments and asked for a conference. The Senate in-
sisted on its amendments and agreed to a conference. The confer-
ence report was agreed to in the Senate on October 5, 1914,1 and
in the House on October 8, 1914.2
After more than ninety amendments and a lengthy debate that
covers more than eight hundred pages of the Congressional Record, 3
Senator Reed of Missouri was prompted to express his opinion of
the bill before the Senate:
[Tihe title [of the Clayton Bill] ought to be amended to
read: An apology to unlawful restraints and monopoly
This measure has been loudly heralded as the Clayton Anti-
trust Bill. It should be known as the Conferees Capitulation
Bill. . When the Clayton bill was first written it was a
raging lion with a mouth full of teeth. It has degenerated to
a tabby cat with soft gums, a plaintive mew, and an anemic
appearance.0
4
55. Id. at 9085.
56. Id. at 9087
57. Ibid.
58. Id. at 9911.
59. Id. at 12468.
60. Id. at 14610.
61. Id. at 16170.
62. Id. at 16344.
63. 51 CONG. Hic., Parts 1-17 (1914).
64. 51 CoNG. Rc. 15818 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed).
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The bill was presented to the President and signed into law
as Public Law No. 212 on October 15, 1914. The major provisions
of the Clayton Antitrust Act may be briefly summarized as follow- 65
Sec. 2: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged m
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discrim-
inate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities where the effect of such discrimination
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." This
prohibition was qualified by the proviso "that
nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination
in price between purchasers of commodities on ac-
count of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity
of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allow-
ance for differences in the cost of selling or trans-
portation, or discrimination in price in the same or
different communities made in good faith to meet
competition and that nothing herein contained shall
prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in re-
straint of trade."
Sec. 3: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
Commerce" to employ the use of tying contracts
and exclusive dealer arrangements where the effect
of these "may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce. "
Sec. 7" "No corporation shall acquire the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital of two or
more corporations engaged in commerce where the
effect of such acquistion or the use of such stock
may be to substantially lessen competition between
such corporations whose stock or other share
capital is so acquired, or to restrain commerce
or tend to create a monopoly of any line of com-
merce." The prohibition did not apply to stock ac-
quired solely for investment purposes or to the for-
mation of subsidiaries for the carrying out of
"immediate lawful business. "
Sec. 8: "No person shall at the same time" be a director
in any two or more corporations "any one of which
has capital, surplus, and individual profits aggre-
gating more than $1,000,000 if such corporations"
are or were "competitors, so that the elimination of
competition by agreement between them would con-
65. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1964).
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stitute a violation of any of the antitrust
laws. "
The Clayton Act, then, deals with a wide array of matters.
The leading provisions of the Clayton Act may be summarized under
three headings: first, positive prohibitions dealing with holding
companies, tying contracts, local price discrimination, and inter-
locking directorates; second, remedies; and lastly, labor provisions.
Sections nine and ten deal with the misconduct of common carriers.
An Act to Create a Federal Trade Commission, to Define Its
Powers and Duties and For Other Purposes was introduced in the
House on January 22, 1914, by Representative Clayton and referred
by the House to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.6" The
Committee found the bill unacceptable and consequently appointed
a sub-committee to draft a new bill. The new bill was introduced
in the House by Representative Covington.- This bill was referred
to the Committee on Interstate Commerce. On April 13, a new bill,
a revised draft of the former bill, was introduced, again by Repre-
sentative Covington, and referred by the House to the Committee
on Interstate Commerce. 6 The following day this Committee report-
ed the bill to the House without amendment. The Committee stated,
in a report, that the bill provided for a trade commission in accor-
dance with the views that President Wilson expressed in his message
to Congress.69 The preparation of the bill and its course through
Congress were distinct in that there was little significant debate
and a comparative absence of political consideration.7 0 The Republi-
cans cooperated with the Democrats in the passing of the bill in
the House on June 5, 1914. After much maneuvering, debate, and
a joint conference of Congress, the bill passed the Senate on August
5, 1914, amended in many particulars. 71 President Wilson affixed
his signature to the Trade Commission Act on September 26, 1914,
and the bill became formally known as Public Law No. 203-63rd
Congress.72
The major provisions of the Trade Commission Act are Section
3 and Section 5. Section 3 obliterated the Bureau of Corporations
and replaced it with the far more powerful Federal Trade Com-
mission. Section 5 declared that unfair methods of competition are
hereby declared illegal. The Federal Trade Commission was also
66. 51 CONG. REc. 2142 (1914).
67. Id. at 4886.
68. Id. at 6648.
69. Id. at 6714.
70. JONES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 340.
71. 51 CONG. REc. 13319 (1914).
72. Id. at 15790.
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made responsible for enforcing Sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton
Act and, therefore, had co-ordinate authority with the Department
of Justice. The Federal Trade Commission was also given the sole
responsibility for enforcing Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act.
The Federal Trade Commission was also given the power to prevent
false advertising of drugs, cosmetics, foods, and curative or correc-
tive devices. The enforcement provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission were considerably strengthened by making it an offense,
subject to a $5,000 penalty for each violation, to ignore a cease
and desist order after it became final. An order became final
if it was not contested by either party after sixty days from the
date of issuance.7 S
All parties in Congress favored the Trade Commission. Through-
out the country, public sentiment demanded such a commission.
In general, the trusts and corporations were glad to see it estab-
lished. The National Chamber of Commerce sent out an inquiry to
trade organizations throughout the United States. The inquiry elicited
"an almost unanimous recommendation of such a commission. It
was a giant step forward.
' 74
Antitrust Legislatton: After 1914
During the years following World War I, the independent whole-
salers and retailers found themselves experiencing increased com-
petition from chain stores and other mass distributors. The bargain-
ing power of the chains and mass distributors enabled them to
obtain many concessions from suppliers. These concessions come
in many forms: discounts for purchasing in large quantities,
advertising allowances, brokers' commissions where a broker was
not employed, and various services provided by the supplier These
various concessions allowed the large chains and distributors to
charge lower prices because they, in effect, paid lower prices. The
independents demanded that the freedom of suppliers to discriminate
be more strictly delimited. The independents claimed that these
concessions were larger than could be justified.7 5 The Patman-
Robinson Price Discrimination Chain Store Act7 6 was passed in
1936 in response to the demands of the independents.
Section 2 of the Patman-Robinson Act amended Section 2 of the
Clayton Antitrust Act. Section 2c of the Patman-Robinson Act forbids
the payment of a broker's commission where a broker is not
73. PEGRUm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 251.
74. Durand, E. D., The Trust Legslation of 1914, 29 Q. J. ECON. 97. (1914).
75. WILCOX, op. cit. supra note 12, at 57.
76. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 13a, 13b, 21a (1964).
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employed. Section 2 forbids sellers to provide supplementary serv-
ices to buyers "unless such consideration is availaDle on
proportionally equal terms to all other customers. " Other forms
of discrimination are prohibited where the effect "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce . either among sellers who knowingly
receive the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers or
with either of them. " Under Section 2f, the Act declares it
"unlawful for any person in the course of commerce
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by" section 2. Persons accused of discrimination under
this section may defend themselves "by showing that his lower
price, or furnishing of services to any purchaser was
made m good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,
or the services furnished by a competitor ,7
Section 3 of the Act provides criminal penalties for three of-
fenses. It makes illegal the granting or receiving of a proportionally
larger discount made available to competitors "in respect of a sale
of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity " Section 3 also
forbids the establishment of prices "in any part of the United States
at prices lower than those exacted" by the same person "elsewhere
in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition or
eliminating a competitor in such a part of the United States... "
Section 3 also forbids the establishment of prices "at unreasonably
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating
a competitor. . " Violation of these provisions is punishable by
not more than a $5,000 fine or imprisonment up to one year, or
both.78
In 1931, the Supreme Court, in the Raladam case,79 denied the
Federal Trade Commission the right to protect consumers against
false advertising where such was the general practice in a trade.
The Commission was therefore denied the authority to protect con-
sumers in those cases where injury to competitors could not be
proven.80 This loophole in the Trade Commission Act was closed
when Congress amended Section 5 of that Act with the passage of
the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938.81 Section 5 of the Trade Commission
Act was amended by Section 3 of the Wheeler-Lea Act to outlaw not
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
80. Lindahl, Martin L., The Federal Trade Commission Act as Amended in 1938, 47
J. POa. RCON. 502 (1939).
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only "unfair methods of competition" but also "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices. ,"82
In 1926 the Supreme Court denied the Federal Trade Commission
the authority to order a firm to rid itself of the assets of a competitor
if it had merged with that competitor, while the proceedings were
pending, through the use of voting stock which it had unlawfully
acquired.8 3 In 1934, the Supreme Court denied the Federal Trade
Commission the power to act when a holding company had distri-
buted the shares of two competing corporations to its stockholders,
if after acquiring the shares the stockholders had voted to merge
the two concerns.8 4 Needless to say, in the following years there
was considerable use made of this loophole in the law 15
The Second Session of the 81st Congress closed the loophole
in the Trade Commission Act when it passed the O'Mahoney,
Kefauver-Celler Act 6 M 1950. This Act, more commonly known as
the Celler Antimerger Act, amended Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914. Section 7 was amended to extend the pro-
hibitions of Section 7 to cover not only acquired stock but also
"the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged
also in commerce . where the use of such stock by the voting or
granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly ",87 The amendment
was signed into law by President Harry S. Truman on December
29, 1950.88
The preceding list comprises most of the important antitrust
or antimonopoly laws. "The purposes of the antitrust laws are
almost platitudinous." Doubt has been heaped upon the antitrust
laws in recent years, "not because these platitudes are now denied,"
but mostly because of a mistaken view that the antitrust laws are,
in themselves, a complete policy 89 These laws are not a complete
policy, but rather, they are a portion of a policy Congress did not
attempt, in any of these laws, to define the terms it used. Congress
expected that when judicial "decisions were promulgated that other
and additional remedies would be provided by law "90 Thus judicial
interpretation has always been a policy-making device of no small
82. Ibid.
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consequence. Congress has always "supposed that the court would
interpret the law "91
EXEMPTING LEGISLATION
Many industries and business practices have been exempted
from the provisions of the antitrust laws. The two major spheres
of legislation involving a reversal of attitude by Congress have been
in agriculture and foreign trade.92
The first reversal in the seemingly one-tracked mind of Congress
(trust-busting) occurred in 1918 with the passage of the Webb-
Pomerene Act 92 under the Wilson administration. In 1916, the newly-
established Federal Trade Commission issued a two-volume report
on Cooperation in American Export Trade.93 The Commission
recommended that Congress enact declaratory and permissive legis-
lation to remove the present doubt as to the Sherman Law and to
establish the legality of cooperating in export trade. The Commis-
sion's report recommended that especially the smaller manufactur-
ers and producers participating in the export trade be allowed to
compete in foreign markets on more nearly equal terms with foreign
competitors. The Commission proposed that exporters be allowed
to form export associations for this purpose.94
The outbreak of war in Europe on August 1, 1914, presented
favorable conditions for the campaign to legalize combinations for
export trade. It was contended by those backing the Webb Bill
that foreign business was necessary to provide employment for
labor and to "keep the home fires burning." The campaign was
modified to include the war in Europe. Attention was now directed
to the struggle that would ensue for foreign trade after peace returned
to Europe. The country was urged by the Webb Bill promoters to
have its "loins girded for the fray" when peace arrived.
95
There were objections to legalizing export associations. These
objections were well-founded on the contention that export associ-
ations would become "instruments of oppression, repugnant to the
public interest, that such legislation would lead to the breakdown
of the Sherman Law and would open the doors to monopolistic
agreements affecting the domestic market of the United States."9
These objections were met by inserting safeguarding clauses into
91. Ibid.
92. 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964).
93. Report of the Federal Trade Comm. on Cooperation in Amerscan Export Trade,
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96. Jones, Eliot, The Webb-Pomerene Act, 28 J. POL. EcoN. 757 (1920).
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the Bill. These provide that individuals or businesses that enter into
an export association only for the "sole purpose of engaging in
export trade provided such association is not in restraint
of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of the
export trade of any domestic competitor of such association: and
provided further, that such association does not depress prices
within the United States of commodities of the class exported by
such association, or which substantially lessens competition within
the United States or otherwise restrains trade.
The Webb-Pomerene Act became law on April 10, 1918, thus
legalizing the formation of export trade associations. Webb-Pomerene
associations have numbered more than 160, from 40 to 60 of them
being in existence at any one time. Normally they have handled
less than a tenth of the goods exported from the United States.
[I]t seems fair to conclude that the Webb-Pomerene law
has provided a serviceable piece of legislation, and
has accomplished what its name proclaims: An Act
to Promote Export Trade. 98
Congress has not found competition to be in the best public
interests in areas other than foreign trade. Some of the spheres
in which a reversal of attitude toward competition has occurred
are labor, agriculture, public utilities, insurance, and professional
sports.99
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, not conducted for profits. .Nor shall
such organizations . be construed to be illegal com-
binations in restraint of trade under the antitrust
laws. 100
In 1922, Congress passed the Capper-Volstead Act.101 This act
made lawful the employment of such associations as cooperatives.
The Secretary of Agriculture may issue an order of cease and desist
if he has reason to believe, and can prove, that an association
sanctioned under this act is unduly enhancing the price of any
agricultural product. 10 2
97. 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964).
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The Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926103 is another law that
exempts farmers from antitrust. This Act allows farmers to collect,
disseminate, and interpret trade statistics, an activity that has re-
sulted in the downfall of many trade associations.1 0 4
The Fisheries Marketing Act of 1934 exempted fishermen from
the antitrust laws in the same manner as the Capper-Volstead Act
exempted farmers. 0 5
Public utilities is another sphere where antitrust exemptions
have been approved by Congress, usually with the recommendations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in each specific case. Rail-
roads, telephone companies, motor carriers, and water carriers have
been allowed to merge. The resulting combinations are always
subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency 106
Congress exempted combination marine insurance companies
from antitrust laws in 1920. This action was designed to encourage
the development of marine insurance by American companies. The
McCarren Act of 1945 suspended the antitrust laws against rate
agreements by insurance companies. The suspension was only
applicable for a period of three years making the antitrust laws
enforceable thereafter but only to the extent that such business is
not regulated by state law The result of the McCarren Act was
to stimulate enactment of laws at the state level, regulating rate
agreements, prohibiting discrimination, and prohibiting representa-
tion by insurance companies.1 0 7
The maintenance of competition is the general objective of
government antitrust legislation. Those spheres of the economy that
are exempted are still of less importance than those regulated. In
most cases where exemptions have been granted, alternative controls
have been applied. These exemptions apply in part to fields that
are highly competitive and in part to those fields where competition
may not be in the best public interest.1 08
Suspension of Antitrust During Depression
Between the years of 1929 and 1932 the economy of the United
States slid from prosperity to depression. The national income of the
United States fell from $90 billion to $40 billion. The Federal Reserve
Board's index of industrial output dropped from 110 to 58. At the
102. WILCOX, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 363.
103. 44 Stat. 802 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-457 (1964).
104. Witcox, op. cit. supra note 12, at 363.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
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end of 1932 nearly 15 million workers were unemployed.109 The newly
inaugurated President, F D Roosevelt, proposed to rebuild the
country with the New Deal. The general structure of the New Deal
had been outlined m Republican policies in the years after 1920
but it required F D. R. to turn these policies into a bold experiment
of government regulation and direction aimed at rebuilding the
economy 110 The New Deal was founded on the National Industrial
Recovery Act of June 16, 1933.111 The National Recovery Administra-
tion was set up to administer and carry out the provisions of the
NIRA.
The policy of the Congress under the NIRA is delineated in
Section 1 of the Act.
[Ilt is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to
remove obstructions to the free flow in interstate and foreign
commerce to provide for the general welfare by pro-
moting the organization of industries for the purpose of co-
operative action among trade groups, to maintain united
action of labor and management to eliminate unfair
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utili-
zation of the present productive capacity of industries, to
avoid undue restriction of production [to] increase pur-
chasing power, to reduce unemployment, to improve
standards of labor 112
The NIRA practically suspended the Antitrust laws. It condoned
trade associations and established and enforced Codes of Fair Com-
petition. The codes were a product of negotiation between organized
labor and trade associations. The codes were administered by code
authorities largely composed of or selected by trade associations.
The trade associations controlled the policies and the personnel of
the Code Administration. The financing of the Code Administration
was usually accomplished by placing mandatory assessments against
each of the firms in industry The result of this was to give to the
trade association the powers of government, including the power
to tax.11 8
The codes of fair competition controlled the terms of sale, the
prices, production, capacity, and the channels of distribution. Some
codes contained provisions designed to allot the market among the
members of a trade.1 1 4
109. Id. at 349.
110. PEGRUm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 467.
111. National Industrial Recovery Act, Ch. 90 § 3(c), 48 Stat. 196 (1933) [now Nation-
al Labor Relations Act § 10 (e)], as amended, 73 Stat. 525, 541, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159, 160,
164 (1964).
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113. WiLcox, op. cit. aupra note 12, at 351-352.
114. Id., at 353-357.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
[The codes] perverted the concept of unfairness in com-
petition itself. Industry by industry, they were designed by
a majority to curb the competitive propensites of an obstre-
perous minority Item by item, they copied the pattern
of a European cartel., 5
The NIRA was declared to be unconstitutional by a unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court in Schechter Poultry Corporation v
United States in 1935.116 The Supreme Court declared the NIRA
unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress did not have the
authority to delegate legislative power to the President, and the
Act invaded the field of intrastate commerce reserved to the
separate states.117
It is probable that the NIRA was like a vaccination, giving
the United States a mild case of the cartel disease and im-
munizing it against the disease itself. It is certain that-as
long as this experience remains in memory-there are few
who would welcome its return. 18
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS
The various antitrust laws have their own procedures of enforce-
ment. The Sherman Act relies solely upon the courts for enforcement.
The Federal Trade Commission alone has the responsibility for
enforcing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
Federal Trade Commission has coordinate authority with the At-
torney General for enforcement of Sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the
Clayton Act. The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for seeing
that those who associate under the Webb-Pomerene Act do not
violate the provision of that Act. The Capper-Volstead Act is ad-
ministered by the Secretary of Agriculture. When these authorities
are disobeyed, disregarded, or appealed, the Court must intervene.
When all is said and done, it is still the courts that interpret and
enforce all laws. It is for the Court to interpret the letter of the law
The courts enforce all the laws of the land. In so doing, they merely
sit in judgment to resolve the issues between the plaintiff and the
defendant.1 19
The first case to come before the Supreme Court on the plaintiff's
contention that the defendant had violated the Sherman Act was
115. Id., at 358.
116. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
117. PEGRUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 468. (citing from Schechter Poultry Corp. v,
United States, supra note 116).
118. WILaox, op. cit. supra note 12, at 350.
119. PEGRUM, Op. cit. 8upra note 3, at 260.
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United States v E. C. Knight Company. 20 The defendant, by pur-
chase through contract, had acquired control of the production of
98 per cent of the sugar manufactured in the U. S. The plaintiff
contended that the contracts via which the defendant had acquired
control of 98 per cent of the refined sugar manufacturing constituted
a combination in restraint of trade and brought suit to cancel the
contracts. 121 In the court's opinion, the issue at stake was whether
or not monopoly in manufacturing could be directly suppressed by
an act of Congress. 122 The Court held that "commerce succeeds to
manufacture and is not part of it'1 23 thus finding in favor of the
defendant.
[T]he undoubted principle that national legislation cannot
control manufacture as such, but only interstate and foreign
commerce, was held conclusive on the issues involved; and
the effectiveness of the Sherman Law to accomplish the
main purpose of its enactment was set back 16 years.
124
"The recognition of the vital possibilities of the law really dates
from the decision of the Northern Securities case.' 1 25 This suit
28
was brought by the United States against the Northern Securities
Company, a holding company incorporated in New Jersey, under
the plaintiff's contention that the object of the defendant was to
form a combination in restraint of interstate commerce.
27
The object of the Northern Securities Company was to bring
under a common control the Great Northern Pacific Railways. The
Court held that:
No scheme or device could more certainly come within the
words of the Sherman Act . . or could more effectively
and certainly suppress free competition between the con-
stituent companies. This combination is, within the meaning
of the Act, a trust; but if not, it is a combination in restraint
of interstate and international commerce; and that is enough
to bring it under the condemnation of the Act.
2
The Court decision preventing the Northern Securities Company
120. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
121 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 389.
122. PEGUm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 264.
123. JONES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 390. (citing United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,
supra note 120).
124. Address by G. W Wickersham, Attorney General of the United States, given before
the Staten Island Club on "The Dissolution of Trusts" 48 CONG REc. 125 (App. 1912)
(included In the remarks of Representative Mann).
125. Ibid.
126. Northern Securities Co., v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (More popularly
known as J. P. Morgan v. President Roosevelt).
127. Jox s, op. cit. supra note 20, at 399.
128. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, supra note 126.
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from merging the two railroads was significant in the interpretation
of the Sherman Act. This decision marked the first successful attempt
m which a holding company was attacked as a restraint of trade.
This decision was of no small importance in its influence upon
economic conditions; it encouraged the federal government to
institute proceedings against trusts and caused big business to look
upon the trustee device with askance. 129
After the Northern Security case, the Court upheld the govern-
ment in every suit involving a railroad combination. In United States
v Terminal Railroad Association, °30 the Court forbade those railroads
owning a terminal to deny their competitors access to that terminal.
In the Union Pacific case'3 ' and the Southern Pacific case, 32 the
Court ordered the defendants to divest themselves of stock they
held in other lines. In 1920 the Court broke up combinations that
enabled two railroads to control a number of anthracite mining
companies. 13 3 There was no evidence in any of these cases that the
defendants had obtained or desired to obtain a monopoly, or that
they had practiced cut-throat competition. 3 4
The Sherman Act was quickly realized as an effective law in
the regulation of railroads:
The best evidence that this statute is now recognized as
a vital piece of legislation is afforded by the fact that . .
protracted and expensive suits were avoided by a dissolution
agreement reached in conference between the New Haven
[Railroad] and the Federal Department of Justice. 3 5
Among the most famous industrial combination, merger, trust,
and monopoly cases were those of the Standard Oil Company, The
Tobacco Trust, The Shoe Machinery Trust, The Harvestor Trust, and
The Steel Trust. The courts displayed much more tolerance to manu-
facturers' violations of the trust laws than they did to the railroads'
One of the most important decisions involving industrial mergers
was the decision of the Court m the Standard Oil case. 36 On
November 16, 1906, the government brought suit against the Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey, seventy subsidiary corporations and
seven individual defendants charging violation of the Sherman Act.
In a unanimous decision on November 20, 1909, the Circuit Court
129. JONES, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 403.
130. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
131. United States v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
132. United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922).
133. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920), United States v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
134. WLCox, Op .cit. supra note 12 at 143.
135. RIPLEY, W Z., TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS, 503 (1916).
136. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 173 Fed. 177. (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1909).
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held that the Standard Oil Company was a combination in restraint
of trade and therefore in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court also held that the defendant, being a monopoly, was in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 7 Standard Oil immediately
appealed to the Supreme Court.3 8 The Supreme Court held the
defendant in unreasonable restraint of trade and as a combination
with monopolistic intent. The defendant was ordered to undergo
dissolution proceedings. 3 9
The suit against the Tobacco Trust'4 0 was initiated in 1907 by
the government on the contention that the new American Tobacco
Company was formed to monopolize the tobacco industry and to
stamp out competition . 4 1 The defendant placed heavy reliance on
the decision of the Court in the Knight case. The defendant contended
that it was, as a manufacturer, exempt from the operation of the
antitrust laws. The plaintiff contended, and the Court held, that
the defendant was guilty of unreasonable restraint of trade and
was making an attempt to monopolize the tobacco industry The
American Tobacco Company was given six months to dissolve
itself.14 2
The factor that sets the American Tobacco case and the Standard
Oil case in a position of importance is the consideration of the rule
of reason in both cases. The first word in the Sherman Act applies
the law to "Every contract, combination or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce. ,,'48 It is obvious that the
Sherman Act is not realistic if interpreted to include normal con-
tractual relationships.
The common law applied a rule of reason to restraints of trade.
If the restraint was an ancillary restraint, the courts would apply
the rule of reason; enforcing such restraints if they were limited
as to duration and extent. If the restraint of trade was nonancillary,
some of the common law courts would apply the rule but more
often they did not. 4 4 It was often argued, in earlier cases under
the Sherman Act, that the rule of reason should apply to that act;
the courts for many years rejected this contention.14 5
The Sherman Act, itself, did nothing to clarify the situation.
137. JONES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 407. (citing United States v. Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey, supra note 136).
138. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
139. JONES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 407. (citing Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, supra note 138).
140. United States v. American Tobasco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
141. PEGRUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 269.
142. JONES, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 413-419. (citing United States v. American
Tobacco Co., supra note 140).
143. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
144. WILCOX, op. cit. supra note 12, at 129.
145. PEaRUx, op. cit. supra note 3, at 302.
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The issue was first joined in the Trans-Missourt Freight Association
case'"6 in which the Court held that it was not the intent of Congress
to give statutory effects to common-law precedents and, therefore,
the Act was not confined to unreasonable agreements but applied
to all agreements in restraint of trade. In the Addyston Pipe case,14 7
the Court held that the rule of reason was confined to restrictions
that were ancillary to lawful contracts and did not apply to non-
ancillary restraints of competition because such restraints were
made unlawful by their very purpose. 48 The use of the rule of
reason was not to be employed under either interpretation. 14 9
The law did not accept the rule of reason until Chief Justice
White handed down the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases in 1911. In each of
these cases the Court wrote the rule of reason into the law in an
obiter dictum. With respect to the first section of the Sherman Act,
Chief Justice White made the following statement:
[Congress] not specifying, but indubitably contemplating
and requiring a standard, it was intended that the standard
of reason which had been applied at the common law and
in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the statute, was intended to be the measure
used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case
a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong
against which the statute provided. 250
With respect to the second section of the Sherman Act, Justice
White made the following statement:
[T] he criterion to be resorted to in any given case for
the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the (second)
section have been committed is the rule of reason guided by
the established law and by plain duty to enforce the prohibi-
tions of the Act, and thus the public policy which its re-
strictions were obviously enacted to subserve.' 5 '
146. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)
147. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
148. While introducing the "Sherman Act" to the Senate on January 25, 1889, Senator
Sherman made the following statement. "It (Section 1) sets out the rule of the
common law which prevails in England and this country.
'It would appear, therefore, that the Court was mistaken in the Trans-Missouri Case
in which it held that it was not the intent of Congress to give statutory effects to
common law precedent. Furthermore, since English common law did apply the rule of
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The contention of Justice Harlan (a dissenter m both cases)
that the Court, by judicial legislation, had amended an act of
Congress was to prove a contention with no basis for concern. Con-
gress did not reverse the Court, but instead limited the application
of the Clayton Act to those cases in which the lessening of com-
petition might be substantial. From this time on, the rule of
reason was accepted and employed in interpreting the Sherman
Act.15 2
In the United Shoe Machinery case of 1913, the government
brought criminal proceedings against the president of the United
Shoe Machinery Company 153 The government contended that the
United Company had affected a combination of three competing
concerns engaged in the manufacturing of 95 per cent of all shoe
machinery, and had therefore violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act by forming a combination in restraint of trade. The government
also charged the defendant with forming a conspiracy to restrain
trade. According to the Court, the question to be decided was whether
or not the combination was within the penalties of the Sherman
Act.154
The opinion of the Court was unanimous and brief. The Court
refused to find the merger of the three concerns, controlling 95
per cent of the shoe machinery production, to be in violation of
the Sherman Act. The Court held that each of the three concerns,
now composing the United Shoe Machinery Company, had been given
a legal monopoly by virtue of the patents the firms held in their
shoe machines. The Court went on to state that since these three
concerns did not compete with each other it is difficult to see "why
the collective business should be any worse than its component
parts." The Court held that the combination was merely an attempt
to secure greater efficiency and was a legal monopoly The judge
pointed out that the disintegration aimed at by the Sherman Law
did not extend to "reducing all manufacture to isolated units of the
lowest degree." The Court dismissed the case. 55
In 1912 the government instituted suit against the International
Harvester Company under the Sherman Act. 156 The government asked
for dissolution of the International Harvester Company on the
grounds that it was a combination in restraint of trade. The Inter-
national Harvester Company was created by merging the five leading
152. Wrncox, op. cit. eupra note 12, at 131.
153. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
154. JONES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 431. (citing United States v. Winslow, supra note
153).
155. Id. at 432.
16. United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 Fed. 987 (D. C. Minn. 1914).
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manufacturers of harvesting machines. The five plants of these
companies produced approximately 85 per cent of the harvesting
machines in the United States. The Circuit Court decided in favor
of the plaintiff and ordered the Harvester Trust to dissolve itself.157
The Court stated that while there was no limit under the
American law to which a business might independently grow
when 80 to 85 per cent of the business was combined, by
combination, all competition was eliminated the result-
ing restraint of trade was unreasonable. 158
The company appealed to the Supreme Court but withdrew its
appeal and accepted the decree of the lower Court before a decision
was reached in the high Court.159
In 1916 the Court, in United States v American Can Company,8 0
refused to break up a manufacturer controlling nine-tenths of the
output of tin cans. The Court held that the defendant "had done
nothing of which any competition or consumer of cans complains or
anything which strikes a disinterested outsider as unfair or un-
ethical.", 1
What is the significance of the three cases just presented? Why
were the United Shoe Machinery Company and the American Can
Company allowed to continue their combination while the Interna-
tional Harvester Company was ordered to dissolve itself?. Was the
Court differentiating between "good" and "bad" trusts? Did the
Sherman Act forbid all trusts or merely the "bad" trusts? The
Court's decision in the United States Steel Case of 1920162 partially
defined the difference between a good trust and a bad trust.
The United States Steel Corporation was a combination of 12
concerns. The 12 concerns were the result of mergers of 180 separate
companies. United States Steel was the result of the largest merger
in the nation's history Horizontally, United States Steel extended
to all the types of steel mill products. Vertically, United States
Steel extended from mining to fabrication. The United States Steel
Corporation controlled one-half of the nation's steel supply when it
came before the Supreme Court in 1920.163
The government charged United States Steel with illegal restraint
of trade and monopoly in October of 1911. Nine years later, in 1920,
157. JoNES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 434. (citing United States v. International Harvest-
er Co., supra note 156).
158. Ibd.
159. Id. at 435.
160. 230 Fed. 859 (D. C. Mo. 1916).
161. Id. at 861.
162. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
163. WiLcox, op. oUt. supra note 12, at 144.
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the Supreme Court found that the combination did not violate the
law The Court admitted that United States Steel was big and power-
ful, but that it did not possess a monopoly 164 The Court stated that
"the law does not make mere size an offense. It requires overt
acts and trusts to its prohibitions of them and its power to repress
and punish them." 165 The majority of the Court held the law to be
"intended merely to suppress unfair practices." 166
The outbreak of the "Great War" suspended antitrust litigation.
The period immediately after World War I marked a change in the
political atmosphere. The outburst of economic nationalism gave
use to a protectionist philosophy that was ill-adapted to trust
busting. 67 The decision of the Supreme Court in the Steel Case had
granted manufacturing virtual immunity from prosecution for mo-
nopolists' combinations. It was not until after the "Great War" that
a sharp change occurred in the interoretation of the Sherman law
Perhaps the Court was under the influence of economic nationalism
when it handed down its decision in the Aluminum Case.
The government filed suit against the Aluminum Company of
America in 1937 The government alleged that Alcoa monopolized
the manufacture of virgin aluminum and the sale of aluminum
sheets, alloys, cables, and bars in the United States. The government
prayed that the Court dissolve Alcoa in order to reestablish compe-
tition in the aluminum industry The District Court entered an
opinion holding the defendants not guilty and dismissed the case. 168
The government appealed and the decision was reversed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. 169 Judge Hand finally reversed the dictum,
set forth in the Steel Case, that mere size is no offense under the
Sherman Act. Judge Hand ruled that, "Size was not only evidence
of violation, or of potential offense it was the essence of the
offense." '"1 0 As far as Judge Hand was concerned, the case was
proved by showing Alcoa's market power Alcoa manufactured over
90 per cent of the virgin aluminum, and therefore had monopoly
power 1n
Although the Court was willing to pronounce Alcoa a monopoly,
it was not about to break up that monopoly The Court recommend-
164. joNEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 438.
165. United States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 162.
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167. WILcox, op. cit. supra note 12, at 146.
168. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F Supp. 97 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
169. The case was certified to the Circuit Court of Apneals (2d Cir.) on June 12, 1944,
(322 U.S. 716), because the Supreme Court was unable to obtain a quorum to sit on the
appeal (320 U.S. 708).
170. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
171. Adams, Walter, The Aluminum Case- Legal Victory - Economie Defeat, 41 AM.
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ed that remedial measures be withheld until such time as the District
Court could ascertain and evaluate the effects of the government's
program for the disposal of surplus aluminum plants. "The task of
creating competition in the aluminum industry was shunned by the
Court and assigned to a disposal agency of the government."'1 72 In
1950 the Court denied the government's prayer that Alcoa be dis-
solved on the premise that "the weakening of any aluminum pro-
ducer would lessen the buoyancy of the industry as a whole."11, 8
The Supreme Court endorsed the decision of the Aluminum Case
and further defined monopoly in the American Tobacco case of
1946.174 The Court held that the American Tobacco Company could
be convicted of monopolization, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
without proof that they had abused their power In the words of
the Court:
The material consideration in determining whether a mo-
nopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competi-
tion is actually excluded, but that power exists to raise prices
or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so.
7
5
"The ghost of the steel decision was thus laid by the Supreme
Court itself.' 176
The Court again found itself facing the problem of the "good"
trust in the Shoe Machinery case of 1953.7 In this case the Court
held that United Shoe had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act
by monopolizing the shoe machinery market and certain supply
markets.1 7 8 As for the reason for United Shoe's monopolization of
the market, the Court said:
United's market control is attributable first, to the com-
pany's original constitution, approved in 1918 by the Supreme
Court, second to the company's superior products and serv-
ices, and third, to the company's business practices
[whichi have not been predatory, immoral, nor, on their
face, discriminatory as between different customers.1 79
The Court pointed out that monopoly is lawful if it is "thrust upon"
172. Id. at 918.
173. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 81 F Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
174. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
175. Id. at 811.
176. WILCOX, op .it. supra note 12, at 149.
177. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F Supp. 295 (D. C. Mass. 1953).
178. Judge Wyzanski stated. "Until Alcoa lost its case in 1945, there was no significant
reason to suppose that United's conduct violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. What
United is now doing is similar to what it was doing, but the activities which were
similar stood uncondemned - indeed, one ought to go further and say that they were in
part endorsed." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., supra note 177, at 348.
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the monopolist. The Court went on to say that a monopoly power
is unlawful
[I]f that power is to any substantial extent the result of
barriers erected by its own business methods (even though
not predatory, immoral, or restraining trade .), unless
the enterprise shows that the barriers are exclusively the
result of superior skill, superior products, natural advantages,
technological or economic efficiency, scientific research
legal licenses, or the like. i °0
The Court also pointed out that, "The offense of attempting to
monopolize requires evidence of intent; the offense of monopolizing
does not."'' The Court did not find monopolization illegal as such.
As a remedial action, the Court imposed upon the United Company
a code of conduct stricter than that which would apply to competi-
tive concerns. The Court required United to sell as well as lease
its machines, shorten its leases, modify the terms of the leases,
and grant licenses under its patents to its competitors. 8 2 United
Shoe Company appealed the decision but it was upheld by the
Supreme Court.8 3
What is remarkable about the Shoe Machinery decision . . .
is the fact that it makes violation of Section 2 (Sherman Act)
hinge upon the existence of exclusionary practices--legal
and moral though they be. .s1
Of eight antitrust decrees entered in the years following the
Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases in 1911 which condemned
specific types of unfair competition as used by an individual concern,
everyone was directed against a merger which was prosecuted as
such. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 extended the regu-
lation of unfair methods of competition to include all business
concerns engaged in interstate commerce. 18 5 The Trade Commission
Act also created the Federal Trade Commission and gave it the
authority and partial responsibility for enforcement of Sections 2,
3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act.18 6 The Federal Trade Commission
was given no statutory authority under the Trade Commission Act
for proceeding against combinations, conspiracies, and monopolies
180. Ibid.
181. Win-ox, op. cit. aupra note 12, at 149.
182. Id. at 150.
183. 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
184. Keyes, L. S., The Shoe Machinery Case and the Problems of a Good Trust, 68
Q. J. EcoN. 1 (1938).
185. Watkins, M. W., The Sherman Act" Its Destgn and Its Effects, 43 Q. J. ECON. 1
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prohibited by the Sherman Act. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has interpreted this section as including those restraints
of trade that are outlawed by the Sherman Act.1 8 7 The Celler Anti-
merger Act of 1950 amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act to make
illegal the acquisitions of stock of assets where the effect "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly "18 The Federal Trade Commission thus found combi-
nations, mergers, and monopolies within its sphere of responsibility
The Court handed down its first definitive interpretation of the
Celler Antimerger Act m 1958. The Department of Justice sued to
enjoin the merger of Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Steel."8 ,
The merger would make the industry more competitive, argued the
defense, since it would enable Bethlehem to compete more effectively
with United States Steel.1 0 This contention was rejected by the
Court on the premise that Congress "made no distinction between
good mergers and bad mergers. It condemned all which came within
the reach of the prohibition of Section 7 "191 The Court further pointed
out that "the acquisition of Youngstown by Bethlehem would violate
section 7 in that in each of the relevant markets considered the
effect may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create
a monopoly "192 This decision established the Celler Act as an ef-
fective law.
The government brought suit against duPont and General Motors
in 1949, charging that duPont's acquisition of General Motors' stock
had had the purpose and effect of controlling General Motors. 9
DuPont, it was charged, was using its control of General Motors
to obtain a preferred market for duPont's products. Suit was brought
against these companies under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.9 4
The District Court held that the government had failed to prove
its case. The government appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court. 9 5 The Supreme Court held that duPont had sought and ob-
tained a preferred position in the General Motors' market. 19 6
The duPont Case was significant for two reasons. First, the
decision was significant for the strictness with which it defined the
187. Nelson, D. C., A Study of the Relationship Between Selected External Market
Variables and Market Conduct and Concentration Distribution in the Grain Processing
Industry, p. 67. (unpublished Ph. D. thesis in Love Library, University of Nebraska, 1964).
188. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1964).
189. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F Supp. 576 (D.C. N.Y. 1958).
190. WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 12, at 155. (citing New York Times, Nov. 21, 1958).
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relevant market. Secondly, the decision was significant in the
force which it gave to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court
explicitly applied Section 7 to vertical integration. The result of this
was to enable the government to prosecute combinations that were
of a vertical nature. It became apparent that Section 7 had been
eta sleeping giant all along.'" 197
This somewhat cursory examination of the development of the
antitrust laws with regard to combinations, mergers, and trusts
illustrates the judicial role in the interpretation of statutory law
The Court disabled the Sherman Act in the Knight case by deciding
that manufacturing was not commerce, and therefore it did not
fall under the provisions of that Act. The Northern Securities case
marked the first successful attempt in which a holding company was
condemned as being in restraint of trade. The Northern Securities
case was instrumental in the downfall of the holding company as
a business device and in proving the effectiveness of the Sherman
Act in railroad regulation. The Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases marked the advent of the rule of reason as an effective tool
for trust busting. The Shoe Machinery case brought the government
face-to-face with the problem of a good trust. Even though the
United Shoe Machinery Company controlled 95 per cent of the product
on its market, the Court refused to find the concern in restraints
of trade and dismissed the case. The Court, in the American Can
case refused to break up a monopoly because it had done nothing
to cause it to violate the Sherman Act. In 1920 the Court refused
to find the United States Steel Corporation in violation of the anti-
trust laws because the law did not make mere size an offense. This
latter decision probably marked the low point in enforcement of
antitrust laws. The United States Steel decision granted manufactur-
ing virtual immunity from the antitrust laws for 25 years.
World War I, the Great Depression of the Thirties, the National
Industrial Recovery Act, and finally, World War II suspended prac-
tically all antitrust litigation. It was not until the Aluminum Case
in 1945 that the antitrust laws were revived by the celebrated
decision of Judge Learned Hand. Judge Hand ruled that size was
the essence of the offense. The decision of the Court in the American
Tobacco case of 1946 further supported the decision of the Aluminum
case in its decision that a conviction of monopolization could be
secured without proof that a monopoly had abused its power The
Court finally settled the problem of a "good" trust in the United
Shoe Machinery case of 1953, when the Court held that a monopoly
is lawful if it is forced upon the monopolist. In respect to the lawful
197. Id. at 158.
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monopoly, the Court imposed a stricter code of conduct upon that
concern than it would have a competitive concern. It was in the
Shoe Machinery case that the Court set a precedent by making
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act dependent upon exclusion-
ary practices. The Court put teeth into the Celler Antimerger Act
in 1957 when the Court held that Congress made no distinction
between good mergers and bad mergers. The duPont case placed
Section 7 back m the fight when the Court decided that vertical
integration was in violation of that section of the Clayton Act.
The antitrust laws have been both weakened and strengthened
by judicial interpretation. The Knight case impaled the Sherman
Act upon a legal fine point for 16 years. The decision in the United
States Steel case strangled the antitrust laws for 20 years. Fate
held the antitrust laws in mortman from the beginning of the
Depression until the end of World War II. Judge Wyzanski stated
the case for the judicial conservatism the courts have so liberally
practiced when he stated:
In the antitrust 'field the courts have been accorded by
common consent, an authority they have in no other branch
of enacted law. . they would not have been given, or
allowed to keep, such authority in the antitrust field, and
they would not so freely have altered from time to time
the interpretation of its substantive provisions, if courts
were m the habit of proceeding with surgical ruthlessness
that might commend itself to those seeking absolute assur-
ance that there will be workable competition, and to those
aiming at immediate realization of the social, political, and
economic advantages of dispersal of power. s8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
For the first 114 years after the Declaration of Independence,
the United States had no antitrust legislation upon its statute books.
One could hardly expect the nation with a manifest destiny to lay
strict regulatory rules upon an industrial sector that was experiencing
an explosive rate of growth.
The problem was not one of too little competition. The industry
of this country "grew up" within a laissez-faire environment. Com-
petition was tough-so tough, in fact, that a firm had to fight (and
sometimes fight dirty) or else die. As the competition got rougher,
firms merged and combined in order to alleviate the pains of the
competition. The bigger the firms got, the tougher the competition
between the remaining firms became. The tougher the competition
198. United States v. United Shoe'Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. C. Mass 1953).
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became, the bigger the firms got. It was a one-way, spiraling stair-
way, the steeper the climb the more powerful the firm had to be.
It is a mute question whether the times produced the firms, or the
firms produced the times. The states would not or could not control
the competition. The competitive economy was about to commit
suicide when Senator Sherman of Ohio rose before the Senate and
introduced a Bill to Declare Unlawful Trusts and Combinations in
Restraint of Trade and Production.'9 9
Congress reacted by passing the Sherman Act in 1890. The new
antitrust law was disabled, however, in the Knight case when the
Court held that the Sherman law applied only to commerce and not
to manufacturing. In all sectors, with the exception of the railroads,
monopoly continued to sprout up with very little, if any, resistance.
In the Northern Securities case of 1904 the Court condemned holding
companies; this case was instrumental in providing the government
with some degree of control over railroad monopolization. The most
significant fact about the Northern Securities case is that it cor-
rected the damage inflicted by the Court's decision in the Knight
case.
The Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases were instrument-
al in monopoly litigations in that they revived the rule of reason as
a tool of antimonopoly law The resurrection of this rule broadened
the interpretation of the Sherman Act and made it an effective
instrument of public policy
On August 25, 1914, Senator Thompson of Kansas exhibited a
list of 628 trusts before the Senate. The Senator's list showed seven
trusts capitalized at over one billion dollars and 29 trusts capitalized
at over 100 million dollars. 20 0 It was evident that the Sherman Act
was not as effective as hoped. The cry for new antitrust legislation
went up and Congress reacted by enacting the Clayton Antitrust
Act and the Trade Commission Act. Although Section 2 of the Clayton
Act explicitly prohibits monopoly, it has never been an effective
instrument of antimonopoly litigation. The Trade Commission Act
created the Federal Trade Commission which was given the authority
and partial responsibility of enforcing most sections of the Clayton
Act. The antitrust legislation of 1914 has not been effective anti-
monopoly instruments.
In 1918 the country found itself faced with the war in Europe
and a lucrative market for foreign trade. Congress passed the Webb-
Pomerene Act which allowed firms to combine for the purpose of
199. 20 CONo. Rc. 1457 (1889).
200. 51 CONG. REc. 14222 (1914).
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facing foreign competition with a united front and thus on a more
competitive basis.
In 1920 the Supreme Court, possibly under the influence of
economic nationalism, held that mere size was no offense and not
sufficient grounds upon which to convict a firm of monopolizing.
This was the infamous United States Steel case which suspended
the Sherman Act until after World War II. During the Depression,
Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act which sus-
pended all antimonopoly proceedings until the Act was declared
unconstitutional in 1935. Then came World War II; the government
was, understandably, not willing to institute antitrust litigations.
Finally, in the Alcoa case of 1945, the Court laid the United States
Steel decision away when it declared that market control or size
was the essence of the offense of monopolization. The Court had
finally returned, after a quarter of a century, to antimonopoly liti-
gation.
It is safe to conclude that Congress has been reactionary and
the courts deliberate. The development of a public policy is a slow
process requiring a considerable amount of restraint, especially in
the rapidly changing world of today It is all too obvious that
Congress has fallen short of perfection in its enactment of antitrust
laws. It is apparent that the courts have, at times, lagged seriously
It would be far more expedient to remove the due process clause
from the Bill of Rights, but-
It is better, I think, to go carefully, one step at a time;
to repair and strengthen our edifice rather than to under-
take any rash measure which might bring the whole temple
down upon our heads.2 0 1
Monopoly is what monopoly does. Monopoly is that practice and
degree of control which the Court decides in each individual case
to be unlawful.20 2 The policy of the United States toward monopoly
consists of a governing principle requiring that an unlawful monopoly
be dissolved once it has been identified.
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